Abstract -
I. INTRODUCTION
Metal fatigue problems in aviation are described in a number of sources, as well as in [1] . The inspection programmes for significant structural components are used widely. The content of the programme is based on aircraft component fatigue tests and theoretical calculations.
II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
It is possible to make a conclusion on the aircraft safety [1] using the information about the development of fatigue cracks owing to full-scale aircraft fatigue tests. In terms of aircraft fleet, the information exchange related to open fatigue cracks on the aircraft of the same type is very important. Such a situation is topical when a new type of aircraft is being brought into operation and when the aircraft fleet is small. This problem is discussed in [2] . The general problems of system reliability are considered in a great number of publications (see, for example, [3] - [5] ). Each airplane of the fleet is serviced independently of the others without the exchange of information and the fleet safety is calculated as follows:
where N is a number of airplanes in the fleet and pf1N is at least one aircraft failure in the fleet. Operational life of each airplane is limited by tSL -a specified safe life, after which an airplane is taken out of service. This article also takes into consideration the impact of the human factor on the fleet safety. We assume that during the inspection the fatigue crack will be discovered with probability w, w ≤ 1, even if at the moment of inspection it has a detectable size. Value w is determined by the house rules of the airline, as well as the applied detection methods. Significant structural components of the aircraft will be characterized by vector (TD, TC), where TD is service time when the fatigue crack has already been detected and reached the size of ad. C is service time when the lasting strength of the significant structural component is reduced to the minimum permissible limit because of the crack; it means that the crack reached its critical size ac. The aircraft fatigue failure may occur in case when TC < tSL and its probability is equal to pf1w = (1 -w) r , where r is a number of inspections in interval (TD, TC).
The fatigue crack development in time may be shown with ( ) = 0 , where a0 and Q are the crack development parameters discussed in detail in [1] . Q is crack development speed on a logarithmic scale; in this article we assume that Q is a random variable with lognormal distribution. 
values are known [6] , [8] , it becomes possible to calculate the failure probability for different fleets and inspection programmes. Information about open cracks on the aircraft of the same type helps to prevent the fatigue on the other aircraft of the same type in the fleet. This means that it is sufficient to find at least one crack prior to any aircraft failure in the fleet. For the fleet, each i-th airplane begins operation in the calendar time 1 
where ( ), = ( 1 , … , ) are random values of R realization and ( ) is cumulative distribution function, , = 1, … , . The above-mentioned equations make it possible to calculate function
is a number of inspections, and to choose the required inspection programme, which corresponds to some maximum permissible failure probability.
Log-normally distributed value Q has distribution parameters ℎ 0 and ℎ 1 . Parameter value ℎ 1 is assumed to be 0.346, but parameter value ℎ 0 is unknown, then you have to use the minimal calculation in order to obtain function f ( ℎ 0 , ), where the dependence of failure probability on parameter ℎ 0 will be visible. Now the probability of failure will be presented by the function of ℎ. We suppose that f ( ℎ, ) is such that lim →∞ ( f (θ, )) = 0 for all ℎ, and for every small value des there is minimal inspection number ( ℎ, des ) such that f (θ, ) ≤ des for all ≤ (θ, des ), but a true value of θ is unknown. Thus, = ( ℎ, des ) and f = f ( ℎ, ) are random variables. It means that during the acceptance trials the aircraft may appear to be "weak" if ℎ 0 > ℎ max , which is not accepted and sent to redesign, or to be "strong" if ℎ 0 < ℎ min , when the fatigue cracks develop very slowly. Then there will be some value ℎ 0 * when there will be maximum failure probability. Then, using the minimum value, it is possible to obtain function max ( des ), which allows to receive the required probability des making it possible for maximum probability max not to exceed maximum permissible probability all .
III. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
By this numerical example we assume that SL = 40 000 h, = 0.9, α 0 = 0.28613258 mm, α d = 20 mm, α c = 237 mm and the maximum number of inspections is 20. Two aircraft fleets with 10 airplanes in each were taken for comparison. We can consider that for the fleet without the exchange of information all the airplanes start operating at the same time because they are serviced independently (see Fig. 1 ). For the fleet with the exchange of information, we assume that the interval at which the aircraft is put into operation is +1 − = 500 h. The dependences of both fleet failure probability on the number of inspections are shown in Fig. 3 . It is obvious that the exchange of information is very significant because it requires less frequent inspections. This example provides an analysis of one of the real fatigue test cracks, and the calculated parameter of this crack is ℎ 0 = −8.5885. If it is necessary to ensure that all = 0.05, it will be enough with 14 inspections for each airplane during the operating time for the fleet without the exchange of information, corresponding to the interval between inspections = 2857 h. In order to ensure the same all = 0.05, 9 inspections will be necessary for each airplane during the operating time for the fleet with the exchange of information, corresponding to the interval between inspections = 4444 h.
These inspection intervals are selected on the basis of data of a specific crack. The average crack parameter ℎ 0 in operation may vary; therefore, let us check the possible maximum failure probability of the selected aircraft packages with the help of a minimax if we assume that des = 0.05. Figure 4 shows that the maximum failure probability is much higher: max > all . Fig. 4 . Dependence of failure probability on parameter ℎ 0 for the fleet without the exchange of information, Pdes = 0.05.
It is possible to see from Fig. 4 that the maximum value of failure probability is in the middle. f value is reduced when ℎ 0 value is reduced, because mean durability is increased. This means that the speed of fatigue crack development is too low and the aircraft are taken from service before the cracks reach their critical size. On the other hand, when ℎ 0 is increased, f value is decreased. This happens because mean durability is too low and it increases the number of airplanes sent to redesign.
The same inspection will be carried out for the fleet with the exchange of information. Figure 5 shows the same situation. It means that the maximum failure probability may be higher than the planned one during the trials. This means that it is necessary to reduce the value of des . Some different curves for the fleet without the information exchange are presented in Fig. 6 . The method of minimax will enable us to obtain function max ( des ) in order to select such des , the maximum possible failure probability of which will not exceed the maximum permissible one. This function is shown in Fig. 7 . Fig. 7 . Dependence of maximum failure probability on the design failure probability for the fleet without the exchange of information. Figure 7 shows that the fleet consisting of 10 airplanes requires to reduce the failure probability by modifying the inspection programme to des = 0.002 to make the maximum failure probability during operation not exceed all = 0.05.
For the fleet with the information exchange, it is also necessary to reduce the value of des . The same function max ( des ) will be found for the fleet with the exchange of information in Fig. 9 . Fig. 9 . Dependence of maximum failure probability on the design failure probability for the fleet with the exchange of information.
In this case, the probability should also be reduced, but not so much des = 0.01, which reaffirms the higher safety level for the fleet with the exchange of information. Now, being aware of probability des , it is possible to determine the inspection programmes in accordance with a random crack so that the maximum fleet failure probability does not exceed the value of all = 0.05. In this example, we will assume that the random crack is presented by the dependence of failure probability on a number of inspections, as shown in Fig. 3 . Reducing the probabilities while selecting the programme, more than 20 inspections will be necessary during the operating time for the fleet without the exchange of information, but for the fleet with the exchange of information it will be enough with 16 inspections, corresponding to the interval between inspections = 2600 h.
IV. CONCLUSION
The comparison of fleets with and without the information exchange in terms of open crack changes makes it obvious that, in case of equally permissible failures, fleets with the information exchange can be inspected less frequently than fleets without the information exchange in order to Transport and Aerospace Engineering ________________________________________________________________________________________ 2016 / 3 30 ensure the probability. It should be noted that the maximum failure probability in operation may be higher than in trials; therefore, the minimax method should be used for the creation of the programme. The human factor is significant as well, and it will be discussed in another article.
